Zizek uses radical antagonism to discuss why it is impossible to articulate the fullness of society and why society is therefore impossible. "It is also impossible to adequately represent/articulate this very antagonism/negativity that prevents Society from achieving its full ontological realization" (100).
Zizek uses Laclau's notion of antagonism to discuss the impossibility of society but also how it is impossible to articulate why society is impossible. He then cites Ideology as that guarantee that "the negativity which prevents Society from achieving its fullness does actually exist, that it has a positive existence in the guise of a big Other who pulls the strings of social life" (100-101). Both society and the ability to recognize the impossibility of society are both impossible, which is explained by Laclau's notion of antagonism, which leads to the understanding of universality as impossible/necessary.
Anti-Semitism (Jenny Gruenberg)
Hostility to or prejudice against Jews.
"Anti-semitism is still an emphatically 'untrue', pathological ideological condition." (126). It is pathological because of "the way social antagonism is displaced-obliterated by being 'projected' into the figure of the Jew" (127).
Zizek argues that anti-Semitism is untrue and false due to psychotic-paranoiac violent passage a l'acte, which is the hysterical acting out that is actually in response to displaced trauma. Anti-Semitism is a projection and misdirection of personal trauma that is caused due to social antagonism, which is the impossibility of society and yet the impossibility to articulate why society is impossible.
Concrete Universality (Andrew Durand)
1. A wholeness made apparent through a process of uncovering tensions caused by subgroups that explicate the notion of unity
2. “We are dealing with the multitude of concrete configurations of the democratic society, and these configurations form a kind of Hegelian ‘concrete universality’” (94).
3. This term is useful because it helps explain how political democracy is formulated. This term further give historical significance to that debate as it occurs now.
Contingency (Andrew Durand)
1. The existence of an object or idea that relies on the existence of an apparatus through which meaning is ascribed.
2. “What I am, my concrete social or cultural background, is experienced as contingent, since what ultimately defines me is the abstract universal capacity to think and/or work” (105).
3. This term is useful because it opposes the concept of universality. This is important because it sets up the dialectic that Zizek then uses to explicate the remainder of his argument.
Democracy (Ione Fullerton)
Democracy is an empty terrain upon which individuals open battle for their hegemony.
“what ‘democracy’ will mean, what this term will include and what it will exclude […] is walys the result of contingent hegemonic struggle. However, this very open struggle presupposes not some fixed content as its ultimate referent, but its very terrain, delimited by the ‘empty signifier’ that designates it” (110).
Zizek demonstrates that a fundamental exclusion must occur to ensure that democracy even can become a battlefield for hegemony over which people will fight. This exclusion is not only historical but also in present expression of hegemonic struggle (110).
Disidentification (Andy Monserud)
The estrangement of individuals from their various social identifiers in service of hegemony.
“We are dealing here with what one is tempted to call the ideological practice of disidentification. That is to say, one should turn around the standard notion of ideology as providing a firm identification to its subjects, constraining them to their ‘social roles’: what if, on a different—but no less irrevocable and structurally necessary—level, ideology is effective precisely by constructing a space of false disidentification, of false distance towards the actual co-ordinates of those subjects’ social existence?” (103)
Zizek presents disidentification as a form of social control and a way to create hegemonic solidarity through the dispelling of rhetorical identifiers. It works in the opposite way from another notable form of social control, that of deliberately excluding othered identities in order to solidify hegemonic bases.
Disidentification (Nate Olson)
The process by which an individual creates a personal identity separate from their socially defined position, allowing them to feel unique.
“is not this logic of disidentification discernable from the most elementary case of ‘I am not only an American (husband, worker, democrat, gay …), but” (103)
Helps illuminate an individual’s social position, as what they disidentify with is likely to be what they are, a process known as false disidentification. Furthermore, disidentification helps individuals socialize themselves into fitting into societal norms, as allowing them to feel personally unique dulls the ubiquity of the social position they exist in.
I add that the uniqueness felt through disidentification helps individuals accept their position in the hegemony.
Fullness of Society (Quinn Lincoln)
is the explainable status of what a society is and could become.
“ideological fantasy is not simply the fantasy of the impossible fullness of society:” (100)
The term is used to summarize the impossibility in the notion of antagonism, in that Zizek and Laclau posit the paradoxical relationship between the representation of a fantasy of Society and the discourse required to explain/explore the prevention of that Society.
Hegemony (Nate Olson)
The domination of society by a certain conception of reality and illustrated by the resistance of other elements within the social sphere.
“the key feature of the concept of hegemony lies in the contingent connection between intrasocial differences (elements within the social space) and the limit that separates society itself from non-society” (92).
Hegemony is useful in explaining the impossibility of conceptualizing a reality outside competing realities already present in society. Furthermore, it helps illustrate how discourse is shaped between power and opposition.
Hegemony (Quinn Lincoln)
A nation’s dominance over an aspect of another country/group of coutries.
“the tension that defines the concept of hegemony is best exemplified by its oscillation between the radial revolutionary logic of equivalence,” (92)
This term is important to the work as both Zizek and Laclau build of the term. The term provides a framework of power relations (technically between states, but could be applied to different groups) that allows Zizek to describe the inherent impossibilities of systematic change--in that completely “new” realities are merely reimagined competing realities.
Hegemony is a more widely used term than previously described and understanding the other uses for the term help explain Zizek and Laclau’s ideas.
Hegemony (Valentina Lopez-Cortes) (1) The influence on a society as a result of intrasocial tensions, forces, struggles, and contradictions. (2) “hegemony… a matrix of the relationship between universality, historical contingency and the limit of an impossible Real” (91) (3) This term highlights the rhetoric of power discussed in the text. This framework allows us to understand the constant pressure to balance, in other words the continuous push & pull of contradicting ideologies. This kind of contradiction can be understood in the tensions between radical revolutionary and logic of equivalence for example.
Historicity (Sam Jacobson)
1. The idea that there is a theme or cause within or behind the structures of our social relations.
2. “Historicity proper makes thematic different structural principles of this very (im)possibility” (112).
3. Historicity is important because of how it works to structure our idea of a “global social” (112). This idea helps to illustrate the tension between the concepts of historical change and ahistorical “(im)possibility” of an "endless play of substitutions within a fundamental field" (12)
Historicity (Logan Miller)
The historical authenticity of a statement or idea.
"So, in a way, we should really say that today; although history is not at its end, the very notion of 'historicity' functions in a different way from before" (129)
Historicity frames the world for us, it's how we relate the past to the future and how we create types of reality. There is no way to detach the concept of historicity from society, as we live in a society that is informed by the past.
I add that historicity is also important in that it verifies historical authenticity in how we view the concept of the 'global social', what we find to be historically accurate is how we create a conception of the world and informs how we interact with one another. (Logan Miller)
Ideological Displacement (Ione Fullerton)
In postmodern politics, markers of social difference that are not class based carry the displaced role of demonstrating the suffering cause by capitalism.
In the “theoretical retreat from the problem of domination within capitalism” we deal with “ideological displacement: when class antagonism is disavowed […] other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight […] of the sufferings produced by capitalism” (97).
Understanding ideological displacement allows us to make sense of another phenomenon within postmodern politics: that it does not repoliticize capitalism, because its notions of political are grounded in the “the ‘depolitization’ of the economy” (98). Zizek does this work to make clear that political possibilities within postmodernism do not reach a radical level (99).
Interpellation (Sam Jacobson)
1. The process through which a subject becomes aware of their identity through the permanent questioning of one’s symbolic identity
2. “Not only does the subject never fully recognize itself in the interpellative call: its resistance to interpellation (to the symbolic identity provided by interpellation) is the subject” (115).
3. The limitations of Althusser interpretation of interpellation is that “the subject emerges only when and in so far as interpellation fails” (115). Dolar argues that there is a “remainder/excess that resists symbolization.” This excess in turn, falls into the category of the ideal which is which is where our understanding of our identity resides.
Marxist Essentialism (Nick Hochfeld) 1. Marxist essentialism is the theoretical view that the proletariat are objectively a conduit for class revolution. 2. “take a closer look at Laclau's narrative which runs from Marxist essentialism (the proletariat as the universal class whose revolutionary mission is inscribed into its very social being and thus discernible via 'objective' scientific analysis) to the 'postmodern' recognition of the contingent, tropological, metaphorico-metonymic, link between a social agent and its ‘task’." (95) 3. This term is important because it exemplifies the divide between itself and postmodernism: the idea that the relation between the class actor and its “task” is much more complex.
Naturalization (Nathan Gruenberg)
To bring into conformity with nature.
“What if [the Political] can be operative only in so far as it ‘represses’ its radically contingent nature, in so far as it undergoes a minimum of ‘naturalization’?” (100).
This term is significant because it shows the process of how ideologies and hegemonies are simultaneously incorporated and construct society. It marks how these societal over-arching notions are so hard to contest because we are unable to envision our existence outside of these naturalized concepts.
Other (Nathan Gruenberg)
Groups that are excluded from dominant society/a group that guises as ideology who actually hold complete power (e.g. illuminati).
The exclusionary logic is always redoubled in itself: notionally is the subordinate Other (homosexuals, not white races…) excluded/repressed, but hegemonic universality relies on a disavowed ‘obscene’ particular content of its own” (102-103). “‘Ideology’ is also the name for the guarantee that the negativity which prevents Society from achieving its fullness does actually exist, that it has a positive existence in the guise of a big Other who pulls the strings of social life” (100-101). “
This term is significant because both of these definitions show how difficult it is to step away from the notion that these ideologies are out of our control, and are in no way impacted by the actions of individuals. The contrasting definitions of this term mark how we do not see that ideologies both construct and run our notion of society.
Passionate Attachment (Andy Monserud)
A personal or general obsession with an object, concept or identity.
[In Butler’s work] there is a central notion… that I fully endorse…this notion is that of the fundamental reflexivity of human desire, and the notion (concomitant to the first one, although developed later) of ‘passionate attachments,’ of traumatic fixations that are unavoidable and, simultaneously, inadmissible—in order to remain operative, they have to be repressed” (91).
Zizek returns to passionate attachments a few times throughout the essay. They typically refer to rejected identifiers (i.e. a closeted gay man might have a passionate attachment to his homosexuality, but refuses to be identified with it). These attachments complicate hegemonies because their possessors will often hold on to them despite the fact that the hegemony they ostensibly help to create may reject them.
DAY 2:
Affirmative Deconstruction (Andy Monserud)
Butler suggests that dissecting and questioning a concept does not preclude its use—that through “affirmative deconstruction” one can reimagine and better use a concept without throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
“In the spirit of more recent forms of affirmative deconstruction, that a concept can be put under erasure and played at the same time; that there is no reason, for instance, not to continue to interrogate and to use the concept of ‘universality.’ There is, however, a hope that the critical interrogation of the term will condition a more effective use of it, especially considering the criticisms of its spurious formulations that have been rehearsed with great justification in recent years in postcolonial, feminist, and cultural studies” (264).
This concept of use alongside deconstruction is essential to the projects of the book—hegemony and universality are both in dire need of deconstruction and definition, but Butler, Laclau and Zizek cannot hope to produce any meaningful conclusions on their nature if they get caught up too deeply in these questions. “Affirmative deconstruction,” as Butler says, is an attempt to break up the political stagnation that dense theory of this kind tends toward.
Class (Nate Olson)
The differences in identity between separate groups of people, where each group is composed of people with similar societal positions.
“The unity of class, for Marxism, should be conceived as a set of subject positions, systematically interlinked so as to constitute a separate identity” (300)
Laclau uses this definition of class to explore the differences of his and Zizek’s conceptions of postmodernism. He also uses it to describe the changing nature of class and to illustrate the assault on articulating logics.
Class (Quinn Lincoln)
The interlinked systems of socialization through the (local or global) means of production that create unique identites identities.
(The failure of the postmodern approach, however, is that it has transformed the awareness of the dissolution of class identities [...] into the assertion of an actual dispersion of elements which renders the category of ‘articulation’ obsolete.” (301)
Class is the grounds for Laclau’s opinion that postmodernism has, in a way, failed to be beneficial to the issue of class through its changing of the nature of class.
I found Laclau’s definition of class to be grounded in Marx, thus i asserted that Laclau also intended for class to be grounded in means of production.
Critical Reflection (Nathan Gruenberg)
The action before political action where a theorist thinks about how they are thinking about a theory. According to Butler, this can lead to a infinite movement of circulatory and/or political paralysis (Nathan Gruenberg).
“The fear of political paralysis is precisely what prompts the anti-theoretical animus in certain activist circles. Paradoxically, such positions require the paralysis of critical reflection in order to avoid the prospect of paralysis on the level of action” […] it seems to rest upon the belief that critical reflection precedes political action - that the former sets out the plan for the latter, and the latter somehow follows the blueprint established by the former” (Butler 264-265).
This is an important term because it sets up Butler’s segway into how Aristotle separates thought and action. This is crucial since it is important to understand that action follows deliberation should be quick, but deliberation should be slow. It also stresses the importance that theorists and those trying to spur action should not fear the potential paralysis of deliberation.
Deliberation (Andrew Durand)
1. A form of communication that allows ideas to be contested with the purpose of reaching an agreed upon conclusion.
2. “Whereas practical wisdom is distinguished by deliberation, theoretical wisdom lacks this quality. It is not oriented towards action or, indeed, towards any good attainable by action” (266).
3. This term is important because it draws a communicative distinction between two forms of wisdom. This turn allows greater flexibility when discussing the more nuanced components of already vacuous concepts like wisdom.
Discourse (Jenny Gruenberg)
Written or spoken communication or debate that is formed within a particular society and societal context through language.
Butler insists that "the rules governing particular language games do no exhaust the social actions operative in the process of their implementation. Rules are bent or transformed when they are implemented" (284). Laclau adds that, "The ensemble of rules, plus those actions which implement/distort/subvert them is what we call 'discourse'" (284).
Although on the surface discourse may appear to be simply a written or spoken form of communication, Butler and Laclau assert that there are rules imbedded in language the dictate the meaning and potential of discourse. Discourse is 1) a sum of language rules and 2) the way the rules are changed upon implementation, which can ultimately distort or subvert the "initial" meaning. But then can the "initial meaning" ever be truly articulated if it changes upon implementation?
The Empirical (Nick Hochfeld)
The subject of universality, or what is considered to be constant and self-evident
Butler: “I am not suggesting that these analyses ought to have begun with the givenness of theempirical, since I am in agreement with them that any effort at empirical description takes place within a theoretically delimited sphere, and that empirical analysis in general cannot offer a persuasive explanation of its own constitution as a field of inquiry.” (274)
By calling into question the notion of the empirical, Butler continues her analysis of universality. Here she emphasizes that empirical analysis cannot be taken as a given, because in general, it cannot justify itself. Furthermore, she emphasizes that empirical analysis only takes place in the theoretical, rather than in the real world.
Empty Signifier (Andy Monserud)
Laclau and Butler discuss the idea that even the language of concrete, “real” movements is based around “empty signifiers,” or rhetorical and symbolic devices that are ultimately meaningless.
“One of the key questions to be asked is ‘whether concrete societies, out of movements inherent to their very concreteness, tend to generate signifiers which are tendentially empty’…Laclau and I disagree on how best to think that ‘emptiness.’” (271).
Laclau and Butler both discuss the idea of empty or “floating” signifiers. Butler is hesitant to call a signifier categorically “empty,” saying that when put into broader context a signifier cannot be entirely meaningless. Laclau disagrees, clearly, because in his response he declares universality itself to be “the universality of an empty signifier: for the only possible universality is the one constructed through an equivalent chain” (304).
Hypercriticality (Andrew Durand)
1. A form of criticism that is unable or unwilling to accept certain terms or symbols at face value.
2. “I would not recommend a hypercriticality that puts every word in such discussions into quotation marks” (269).
3. This term is important because it names a prevailing problem in criticism. It further cements the idea that sometimes there can be too much criticism and that can interfere with more important endeavors.
Logic (Logan Miller)
How Laclau envisions humans relating to one another in order to live in society.
"By 'logic', on the contrary, I understand the type of relations between entities that makes possible the actual operation of that system of rules." 284
Logic, according to Laclau, allows us to understand the systems that we have created and which we live in. Laclau further insists that hegemonic structures are the only structures that humans make with pure logic.
Logic (Nathan Gruenberg)
A set of ordering relations that depict the operation of a system in specific contexts.
“the logic answers to a different kind of question: how entities have to be to make those rules possible” (Laclau, 284).
As Logan stated, logic allows us to understand the systems we live in due to our relations with each other. The logic is established after the relations are implemented.
I think one thing I would add is the fact that logic is not universal, but dependent upon the context it is in since specific relations depict how logic will order the system.
Organic Intellectual (Sam Jacobson)
A group or individual who is “engaged in the practice” of shaping or determining the scope and breadth of the “hegemony of a group,” through “political initiatives” and indirect means that are not essential to the infrastructure of the movement (287).
“This widened conception of the intellectual – which I have said, now comprised people such as union organizers, technicians, journalists and others, to whom we could easily add today other groups like social workers, film makers, consciousness raising groups, etc. – Gramsci called ‘organic intellectuals’” (287).
Organic intellectuals are important to consider for they are as Gramsci understood them, “counterposed” to the idea of “traditional great intellectuals” who work to shape a political movement (287). This in turn widens ones’ understanding of a “hegemonic collective” and increases “the role of the intellectual function” in the creation of social movements and the groups that take part in them (287).
Practical Wisdom (Sam Jacobson)
Practical wisdom is knowledge which lends itself to seeking a human good.
“Practical wisdom is that which orientates our judgment and our action towards doing what is right” (265).
Theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom are distinct from each other precisely because they stem from different motivations. Theoretical wisdom seeks to understand things as they are and for their own sake, while practical wisdom is a pursuit of knowledge that can lead to action and the “attainment of a good through action” (266). In this sense, practical wisdom is a key component to our understanding of virtue.
Practical Wisdom (Sarah Edwards)
A type of knowledge that generates virtue and determines the right course of action.
“’Virtue’, in Aristotle’s sense, it that which determines what the end of action should be, and practical wisdom is that which orientates our judgment and our action towards doing what is right” (265)
Understanding practical wisdom is a key component to Butler’s piece because she specifies that action is “the mobilization of knowledge as conduct,” and thus determines that a particular form of knowledge is necessary for any effective action to take place (265). This understanding of wisdom is inextricably tied to deliberation and without it political action would not be possible.
Practical wisdom is more than just a key to understanding virtue because it allows us to critically evaluate the ways in which knowledge and theory play an integral role in the political realm.
Radical Interrogation (Blake Ladenburg):
The assurance of continued critical investigation into an idea, concept, or theory.
"Radical interrogation means that there is no moment in which politics requires the cessation of theory, for that would be the moment in which politics posits certain premisses as off-limits to interrogation--indeed, where it actively embraces the dogmatic as the condition of its own possibility." (264)
Butler utilizes radical interrogation as a process that allows for affirmative deconstruction. By radically interrogating a concept, idea, or theory will hopefully result in a more effective use of the same concept, idea, or theory.
Realization (Ione Fullerton)
1) Realization is the belief that a certain concept, in this text democracy, has been implemented.
2) “So, it seems that the commitment to a conception of democracy which is futural, which remains unconstrained by teology, and which is not commensurate with any of its ‘realizations’ requires a different demand, one which defers realization permanently” (Butler 268).
3) Butler’s work is motivated by a desire for a “radically restructured world” (277)—this world cannot be “realized” or it will stagnate under the illusion of having achieved, or implemented, democracy. The ideality of democracy, democracy “unrealized,” is necessary to avoid its dissolution.
Rhetoric (Jenny Gruenberg)
Language that is designed and constructed to be meaningful and persuasive, yet often lacks meaningful content.
Butler critiques Zizek's notion of rhetoric stating, "The rhetoric also builds the truth that it purports to reveal, and this metaleptic function of his discourse works most efficiently when it remains undisclosed, when the 'transparency' of representation is most dramatically produced. . . . we are fundamentally dependent on language to say and understand what is true, and that the truth of what is said is not separate from the saying" (278-9).
Rather than stating that rhetoric builds truth, Butler argues that because the truth is derived through rhetorical means, the truth will become contaminated by these means. Because the rhetorical means through which the truth is expressed contaminate the meaning of the truth, the truth will not exist as a transparent reality and language will not be an empty vessel, but will add to the meaning of this "truth."
Theoretical Wisdom (Sarah Edwards)
A type of knowledge that has the ultimate aim of happiness and is not oriented towards action.
“Aristotle…concludes that theoretical wisdom is not the same as practical wisdom: theoretical wisdom produces happiness and practical wisdom produces virtue” (265)
Butler draws on Aristotle’s distinction between theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom in order to investigate what kind of knowledge her and her colleagues are pursuing in their discussions of contingency, hegemony, and universality. Theory can often be seen as devoid of action, yet Butler seeks to complicate that notion by distinguishing between forms of knowledge and their differing aims.
Theoretical Wisdom (Nate Olson)
Wisdom that is characterized by metaphysical reflection rather than deliberation with an eye towards future action.
“to the extent that theoretical wisdom seeks true knowledge of the fundamental principles of reality … it is engaged in the practice of metaphysical reflection” (266).
Theoretical wisdom is seen by Aristotle as knowledge for knowledge’s sake rather than knowledge intended to produce action. Butler uses this to examine her and her colleague’s discussion of universality and hegemony.
I’ve added some of what characterizes theoretical wisdom in addition to its ultimate aim.
Theoretical Wisdom (Quinn Lincoln)
A subset of wisdom aimed at achieving happiness through reflection rather than quick action. The term is posited alongside Practical wisdom to provide a holistic and faceted view of intellectual virtue..
“[...] theoretical wisdom, and phronesis, [...], even as they combine in the notion of an overall ‘intellectual virtue.’” (265)
In her discussion about the purpose and effectiveness of the book, Butler examines the nature of knowledge produced. She cites Aristotle in order to gauge the actionability of their thought exercises.
Theoretical Wisdom is meant to be a subset of the whole that includes practical wisdom. I’ve augmented the previous definitions to show this partitioning of the overarching term.
Universality (Ione Fullerton)
1) Universality asserts that claims can be made ‘universally,’ or about all of some things, in this text, cultures.
2) “[Zizek] claims that the concept of universality ‘emerges as the consequence of the fact that each particular cultures is precisely never and for a priori reasons simply particular, but has always-already in itself “cross the linguistic borders it claims”’” (Butler 275).
3)Butler negotiates with Zizek’s assertion, agreeing that every culture has always-already crossed with another culture (which subverts cultural particularity) but takes issue with this universality claimed a priori. This conversation between the two on this term is part of Butler’s desire to interrogate the term “universality,” perhaps to render its use more effective.
Virtue (Logan Miller)
In the Aristotelian sense, virtue is achieved when the end of an action is morally right.
"Virtue, in Aristotle's sense, is that which determines what the end of action should be, and practical wisdom is that which orientates our judgement and our action towards doing what is right."
By emphasising the end virtue Butler is telling the reader that active knowledge is the one worth pursuing. Virtue is the end result of phronesis, or practical knowledge.
Virtue is seperate from practical wisdom in that it is the end result of action, it is the application of practical wisdom that leads to the morally correect thing.
So, in a way, we should really say that today; although history is not at its end, the very notion of 'historicity' functions in a different way from before.
Berlant claims that the fantasies we harbour of the ‘good life’ and the goals that neoliberalism sets for us actually deteriorate our ability to achieve them. The standard that we are led to believe is ‘good’ is becoming harder and harder to actually achieve. If this is true, then how does happiness factor in? Is the situation actually so grim that we delude ourselves into happiness? Is fulfilment even attainable?
Antagonism (Jenny Gruenberg)
Anti-Semitism (Jenny Gruenberg)
Concrete Universality (Andrew Durand)
1. A wholeness made apparent through a process of uncovering tensions caused by subgroups that explicate the notion of unity
2. “We are dealing with the multitude of concrete configurations of the democratic society, and these configurations form a kind of Hegelian ‘concrete universality’” (94).
3. This term is useful because it helps explain how political democracy is formulated. This term further give historical significance to that debate as it occurs now.
Contingency (Andrew Durand)
1. The existence of an object or idea that relies on the existence of an apparatus through which meaning is ascribed.
2. “What I am, my concrete social or cultural background, is experienced as contingent, since what ultimately defines me is the abstract universal capacity to think and/or work” (105).
3. This term is useful because it opposes the concept of universality. This is important because it sets up the dialectic that Zizek then uses to explicate the remainder of his argument.
Democracy (Ione Fullerton)
Disidentification (Andy Monserud)
Disidentification (Nate Olson)
Fullness of Society (Quinn Lincoln)
Hegemony (Nate Olson)
Hegemony (Quinn Lincoln)
- A nation’s dominance over an aspect of another country/group of coutries.
- “the tension that defines the concept of hegemony is best exemplified by its oscillation between the radial revolutionary logic of equivalence,” (92)
- This term is important to the work as both Zizek and Laclau build of the term. The term provides a framework of power relations (technically between states, but could be applied to different groups) that allows Zizek to describe the inherent impossibilities of systematic change--in that completely “new” realities are merely reimagined competing realities.
- Hegemony is a more widely used term than previously described and understanding the other uses for the term help explain Zizek and Laclau’s ideas.
Hegemony (Valentina Lopez-Cortes)(1) The influence on a society as a result of intrasocial tensions, forces, struggles, and contradictions.
(2) “hegemony… a matrix of the relationship between universality, historical contingency and the limit of an impossible Real” (91)
(3) This term highlights the rhetoric of power discussed in the text. This framework allows us to understand the constant pressure to balance, in other words the continuous push & pull of contradicting ideologies. This kind of contradiction can be understood in the tensions between radical revolutionary and logic of equivalence for example.
Historicity (Sam Jacobson)
1. The idea that there is a theme or cause within or behind the structures of our social relations.
2. “Historicity proper makes thematic different structural principles of this very (im)possibility” (112).
3. Historicity is important because of how it works to structure our idea of a “global social” (112). This idea helps to illustrate the tension between the concepts of historical change and ahistorical “(im)possibility” of an "endless play of substitutions within a fundamental field" (12)
Historicity (Logan Miller)
Ideological Displacement (Ione Fullerton)
Interpellation (Sam Jacobson)
1. The process through which a subject becomes aware of their identity through the permanent questioning of one’s symbolic identity
2. “Not only does the subject never fully recognize itself in the interpellative call: its resistance to interpellation (to the symbolic identity provided by interpellation) is the subject” (115).
3. The limitations of Althusser interpretation of interpellation is that “the subject emerges only when and in so far as interpellation fails” (115). Dolar argues that there is a “remainder/excess that resists symbolization.” This excess in turn, falls into the category of the ideal which is which is where our understanding of our identity resides.
Marxist Essentialism (Nick Hochfeld)
1. Marxist essentialism is the theoretical view that the proletariat are objectively a conduit for class revolution.
2. “take a closer look at Laclau's narrative which runs from Marxist essentialism (the proletariat as the universal class whose revolutionary mission is inscribed into its very social being and thus discernible via 'objective' scientific analysis) to the 'postmodern' recognition of the contingent, tropological, metaphorico-metonymic, link between a social agent and its ‘task’." (95)
3. This term is important because it exemplifies the divide between itself and postmodernism: the idea that the relation between the class actor and its “task” is much more complex.
Naturalization (Nathan Gruenberg)
Other (Nathan Gruenberg)
Passionate Attachment (Andy Monserud)
DAY 2:
Affirmative Deconstruction (Andy Monserud)
Class (Nate Olson)
Class (Quinn Lincoln)
Critical Reflection (Nathan Gruenberg)
Deliberation (Andrew Durand)
1. A form of communication that allows ideas to be contested with the purpose of reaching an agreed upon conclusion.
2. “Whereas practical wisdom is distinguished by deliberation, theoretical wisdom lacks this quality. It is not oriented towards action or, indeed, towards any good attainable by action” (266).
3. This term is important because it draws a communicative distinction between two forms of wisdom. This turn allows greater flexibility when discussing the more nuanced components of already vacuous concepts like wisdom.
Discourse (Jenny Gruenberg)
The Empirical (Nick Hochfeld)
Empty Signifier (Andy Monserud)
- Laclau and Butler discuss the idea that even the language of concrete, “real” movements is based around “empty signifiers,” or rhetorical and symbolic devices that are ultimately meaningless.
- “One of the key questions to be asked is ‘whether concrete societies, out of movements inherent to their very concreteness, tend to generate signifiers which are tendentially empty’…Laclau and I disagree on how best to think that ‘emptiness.’” (271).
- Laclau and Butler both discuss the idea of empty or “floating” signifiers. Butler is hesitant to call a signifier categorically “empty,” saying that when put into broader context a signifier cannot be entirely meaningless. Laclau disagrees, clearly, because in his response he declares universality itself to be “the universality of an empty signifier: for the only possible universality is the one constructed through an equivalent chain” (304).
Hypercriticality (Andrew Durand)1. A form of criticism that is unable or unwilling to accept certain terms or symbols at face value.
2. “I would not recommend a hypercriticality that puts every word in such discussions into quotation marks” (269).
3. This term is important because it names a prevailing problem in criticism. It further cements the idea that sometimes there can be too much criticism and that can interfere with more important endeavors.
Logic (Logan Miller)
Logic (Nathan Gruenberg)
Organic Intellectual (Sam Jacobson)
Practical Wisdom (Sam Jacobson)
Practical Wisdom (Sarah Edwards)
Radical Interrogation (Blake Ladenburg):
Realization (Ione Fullerton)1) Realization is the belief that a certain concept, in this text democracy, has been implemented.
2) “So, it seems that the commitment to a conception of democracy which is futural, which remains unconstrained by teology, and which is not commensurate with any of its ‘realizations’ requires a different demand, one which defers realization permanently” (Butler 268).
3) Butler’s work is motivated by a desire for a “radically restructured world” (277)—this world cannot be “realized” or it will stagnate under the illusion of having achieved, or implemented, democracy. The ideality of democracy, democracy “unrealized,” is necessary to avoid its dissolution.
Rhetoric (Jenny Gruenberg)
Theoretical Wisdom (Sarah Edwards)
Theoretical Wisdom (Nate Olson)
Theoretical Wisdom (Quinn Lincoln)
Universality (Ione Fullerton)
1) Universality asserts that claims can be made ‘universally,’ or about all of some things, in this text, cultures.
2) “[Zizek] claims that the concept of universality ‘emerges as the consequence of the fact that each particular cultures is precisely never and for a priori reasons simply particular, but has always-already in itself “cross the linguistic borders it claims”’” (Butler 275).
3)Butler negotiates with Zizek’s assertion, agreeing that every culture has always-already crossed with another culture (which subverts cultural particularity) but takes issue with this universality claimed a priori. This conversation between the two on this term is part of Butler’s desire to interrogate the term “universality,” perhaps to render its use more effective.
Virtue (Logan Miller)
So, in a way, we should really say that today; although history is not at its end, the very notion of 'historicity' functions in a different way from before.
Berlant claims that the fantasies we harbour of the ‘good life’ and the goals that neoliberalism sets for us actually deteriorate our ability to achieve them. The standard that we are led to believe is ‘good’ is becoming harder and harder to actually achieve. If this is true, then how does happiness factor in? Is the situation actually so grim that we delude ourselves into happiness? Is fulfilment even attainable?